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Abstract
We compare a Bertrand with a Cournot duopoly in a setting where
production is polluting and exploits natural resources, and rms bear
convex production costs. We adopt Dastidars (1995) approach, yield-
ing a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal
cost pricing also, to show that softening price competition may lead
to a lower output production in a Bertrand rather than a Cournot
industry. The market structure bringing about the lowest output de-
termines the highest social welfare, given the fact that the negative
environmental e¤ects of production more than o¤set the gain in con-
sumer surplus.
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1 Introduction
In the theory of the oligopoly, it is common knowledge that price rather
than quantity competition delivers a higher amount of output in an industry,
leading in turn to a higher social welfare. This wisdom may not hold in the
case that negative externalities, such as natural resources exploitation and
polluting emission, take place in the industry considered. Moreover, not all
the production cost structures necessarily imply a larger production with
Bertrand competition.
In this note we discuss this argument in a duopoly setting where produc-
tion entails both natural resources exploitation and pollution, and rms bear
a convex cost function. Indeed, Dastidar (1995) shows that, under Bertrand
competition and convex production costs, there is a continuum of Nash equi-
libria, ranging also above marginal cost pricing. In particular, the occurring
equilibrium will depend on the intensity of price competition. In line with
this approach, we establish that the industry output can be smaller with
price rather than quantity competition, provided that the intensity of price
competition is su¢ ciently low.
Given the environmental impact of production, a trade-o¤ emerges be-
tween resource utilisation and pollution on the one hand and consumer sur-
plus on the other, with the rst e¤ect more than o¤setting the second one.
Therefore, the market structure yielding the highest social welfare is the one
that entails the lowest quantity produced.
2 The model
We consider two rms in an industry, producing the same homogeneous good,
and having symmetric and convex production costs:
C = cq2; (1)
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where q is the quantity produced by each rm and c > 0: Let the inverse
demand be linear:
p = 1 Q; (2)
where Q = 2q. Each rm prots are:
 = pq   cq2: (3)
The production of the nal output exploits some natural resources X =
X   wQ; where w > 0 is the marginal exploitation. Also, production goes
along with a negative environmental externality E = gQ2, where g > 0
represents the marginal polluting intensity of output. Consumer surplus is
measured by CS = Q2=2. Social welfare is dened as the sum of industry
prots, consumer surplus and the natural resource, minus pollution:
W = 2 + CS +X   E = Q

p  cQ+ Q
2
  w   gQ

+X: (4)
3 Results
In what follows, we will compare Bertrand with Cournot competition to
show that the latter may have a stronger impact on environment. We start
by examining the equilibrium quantity under Bertrand competition.
According to Dastidar (1995), if rms have symmetric convex costs and
compete à la Bertrand, the Nash equilibrium is necessarily non-unique. In
particular, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is characterised by both rms
setting the same price p, which is bounded by two thresholds pavc  p  pu:
The lower bound pavc (the superscript avc stands for average variable cost)
equals average variable costs, letting rms be indi¤erent between either pro-
ducing at p or producing nothing at all. The upper bound pu (with super-
script u standing for undercutting) is the price at which rms are indi¤erent
between choosing price pu, and marginally undercutting it in order to capture
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the entire demand at pu.
In this setting, the level of pavc is given by equating the inverse demand
function to the average variable cost:
1  2q = cq; (5)
then solving for q and substituting in the demand function we obtain:
pavc =
c
2 + c
: (6)
The upper bound of the equilibrium price obtains by imposing indi¤erence
between duopoly prots (3) and the monopoly prots generated by under-
cutting:
pq   cq2 = 2pq   4cq2: (7)
Solving for p; we obtain
puc =
3c
2 + 3c
: (8)
Finally, by equating the inverse demand function to the marginal cost, solving
for q and substituting into p; we obtain the price equal to marginal cost:
pmc =
c
1 + c
; (9)
where the superscript mc stands for marginal cost pricing. The continuum
of Nash equilibria can be represented by the following expression:1
p =
c
2 + c  : (10)
Parameter  represents the relative intensity of price competition between
rms. Note that, when  = 0; in equilibrium price equals average variable
cost;  = 1 corresponds to the Bertrand reference case in which price is equal
to marginal cost, while at  = 4=3 the price attains the highest level above
1For an analogous application of Dastidars (1995) approach, see André et al. (2009).
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which undercutting takes place. As a consequence,  2 [0; 4=3] : Using (10),
the individual quantity function writes:
qb =
(2  )
2 (2 + c  ) : (11)
We now turn to Cournot competition. Here the quantity in equilibrium can
be easily found by maximising (3) with respect to q, yielding:
qc =
1
3 + 2c
: (12)
By comparing (11) with (12), it emerges that qc > q

b for:
 >  =
2 (1 + c)
1 + 2c
:
Note that
2 (1 + c)
1 + 2c
 4
3
;
for c  1: In other words, the standard e¤ect associated with a Cournot
industry, i.e., a softer competition compared to a Bertrand industry can
indeed be reversed if (i) marginal cost is su¢ ciently high and (ii) the intensity
of price competition is su¢ ciently low.
We are now in a position to evaluate the di¤erences in social welfare
between Bertrand and Cournot competition. According to (11) and (12),
the social welfare with price and quantity competition are:
Wb = X   (2  )
2 (1 + c+ 2v)
2 (2 + c  )2 ; (13)
and
Wc = X   2 (1 + c+ 2v)
(3 + 2c)2
; (14)
respectively. By comparing (13) with (14), it emerges thatWb > Wc for qc >
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qb . The intuition is simple. A low price competition intensity lowers output
production, thus increasing prots and lowering the amount of pollution
and the natural resources exploited during production, but decreasing also
consumer surplus. Nonetheless, the raise on the environment conditions and
prots ultimately more than o¤sets the fall of consumer surplus in the welfare
analysis. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For all c  1 and
 2

;
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3

;
then social welfare is higher with price rather than quantity competition.
The result can be further explained by highlighting the trade-o¤ between
environmental externalities (natural resources exploitation and pollution) on
the one hand and consumer surplus on the other. By evaluating each part of
social welfare separately, it can be easily noted that:
Xb  Xc = 2 (1 + c)   (1 + 2c)
(2 + c  ) (3 + 2c) > 0; (15)
Eb   Ec = w [2c (  3)  5 (2  )] [ (1 + 2c)  2 (1 + c)]
(2 + c  )2 (3 + 2c)2 < 0; (16)
CSc   CSb = [2c (  3)  5 (2  )] [ (1 + 2c)  2 (1 + c)]
2 (2 + c  )2 (3 + 2c)2 < 0; (17)
for  > : This explains that social welfare is high with the market structure
providing the lowest amount of output, because of the lower natural resources
exploitation and pollution, that more than compensate the decrease in con-
sumer surplus.
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